Partial monitoring is a generalization of the well-known multi-armed bandit framework where the loss is not directly observed by the learner. We complete the classification of finite adversarial partial monitoring to include all games, solving an open problem posed by Bartók et al. [2014]. Along the way we simplify and improve existing algorithms and correct errors in previous analyses. Our second contribution is a new algorithm for the class of games studied by Bartók [2013] where we prove upper and lower regret bounds that shed more light on the dependence of the regret on the game structure.
Introduction
Partial monitoring is a generalization of the bandit framework that relaxes the relationship between the feedback and the loss, which makes the framework applicable to a wider range of practical problems such as spam filtering and product testing. Equally importantly, it offers a rich and elegant framework to study the exploration-exploitation dilemma beyond bandits [Rustichini, 1999] .
We consider the finite adversarial version of the problem where a learner and adversary interact over n rounds. At the start of the game the adversary secretly chooses a sequence of n outcomes from a finite set. In each round the learner chooses one of finitely many actions and receives a feedback that depends on its action and the choice of the adversary for that round. The loss is also determined by the action/outcome pair, but is not directly observed by the learner. Although the learner does not know the choices of the adversary, the feedback/loss functions are known in advance and the learner must use this infer a good policy. The learner's goal is to minimize the regret, which is the difference between the total loss suffered and the loss that would have been suffered by playing the best single action given knowledge of the adversaries choices.
The study of partial monitoring games started with the work by Rustichini [1999] where the definition of regret differed slightly from what is used here and the results have an asymptotic flavor. These results have been strengthened in an interesting line of work by Mannor and Shimkin [2003] , Perchet [2011] , Mannor et al. [2014] , the last of which gives non-asymptotic rates for this more general definition of regret that unfortunately do not reduce to the optimal rate in our setting. The regret we consider was first considered by Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [2001] , who showed that a variant of exponential weights achieves O(n 3/4 ) regret in nontrivial games. This was improved to O(n 2/3 ) by Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2006] , who also showed that in general this result is not improvable, but that there exist many types of game for which the regret is O(n 1/2 ). They posed the question of classifying finite adversarial partial monitoring games in terms of the achievable minimax regret. An effort started around 2010 to achieve this goal, which eventually led to the paper by Bartók et al. [2014] who made significant progress towards solving this problem. In particular, they gave an almost complete characterization of partial monitoring games by identifying four regimes: trivial, easy, hard and hopeless games. The characterization, however, left out the set of games with actions that are only optimal on low-dimensional subspaces of the adversaries choices. Although these actions are never uniquely optimal, they can be informative and until now it was not known how to use these actions when balancing exploration and exploitation. Games in this tricky regime have been called 'degenerate', but there is no particular reason to believe these games should not appear in practice. This problem is understood in the stochastic variant of partial monitoring where the adversary chooses the outcomes independently at random [Antos et al., 2013] , but a complete understanding of the adversarial setup has remained elusive.
Contributions
• We develop an improved version of NEIGHBOURHOODWATCH by Foster and Rakhlin [2012] that correctly deals with degenerate games and completes the classification for all finite partial monitoring games, closing an open question posed by Bartók et al. [2014] . 1 Another benefit is that Foster and Rakhlin [2012] and Bartók et al. [2014] inadvertently exchanged an expectation and maximum during the localisation argument of their analysis. A correction is presumably possible, but this would add another level of complexity to an already intricate proof. Our algorithm also enjoys a regret guarantee that holds with high probability.
• Bartók [2013] introduced a class of partial monitoring games and suggested a complicated algorithm with improved regret relative to NEIGHBOURHOODWATCH. We propose a novel algorithm and prove that for these games its regret satisfies O(F nK loc log(K)), where K is the number of actions and F is the number of feedback symbols. The quantity K loc depends on the game and satisfies K loc ≤ K. This bound improves on the result of Bartók [2013] in several ways: (a) we eliminate the dependence on arbitrarily large game-dependent constants, (b) the new algorithm is simpler, (c) our bound is better by logarithmic factors of the horizon and (d) the analysis by Bartók mistakenly combines bounds that hold in expectation in 'local games' into a bound for the whole game as if they were high probability bounds. We expect this could be corrected by modifying the algorithm and analysis, but the resulting algorithm would be even more complicated and the regret would not improve.
• We prove a variety of lower bounds. First correcting a minor error in the proof by Bartók et al.
[2014] and second showing the linear dependence on the number of feedbacks is unavoidable in general.
• The new algorithms and analysis simplify existing results, which think is a contribution in its own right and we hope encourages more research into this fascinating topic with many open questions.
Problem setup Given a natural number n let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We use x, y to denote the usual inner product in Euclidean space. The d-simplex is
d+1 is the dimension of its affine hull. For any set A the indicator function is 1 A (·) and for function f : A → R the supremum norm of f is f ∞ = sup a∈A |f (a)|. A partial monitoring problem G = (L, Φ) is a game between a learner and an adversary over n rounds and is specified by a loss matrix L ∈ [0, 1] K×E and a feedback matrix Φ ∈ [F ] K×E for natural numbers E, F and K. At the beginning of the game the learner is given L and Φ and the adversary secretly chooses a sequence of outcomes i 1:n = (i 1 , . . . , i n ) where i t ∈ [E] for each t ∈ [n]. In each round t the learner chooses an action A t ∈ [K] and observes feedback Φ t = Φ Atit . The loss incurred by playing action a in round t is y ta = L ait . In contrast to bandit and full information problems the loss in partial monitoring is not observed by the learner, even for the action played.
A policy π is a map from sequences of action/observation pairs to a distribution over the action-set [K] . The performance of a policy π is measured by its regret, R n (π, i 1:n ) = max a∈ [K] n t=1 (y tAt − y ta ). When the outcome sequence and policy are fixed we abbreviate R n = R n (π, i 1:n ). The minimax expected regret associated with partial monitoring game G is the worst-case expected regret of the best policy. R * n (G) = inf π max i1:n E[R n (π, i 1:n )] where the inf is taken over all policies, the max over all outcome sequences of length n and the expectation with respect to the randomness in the actions. We let F t = σ(A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A t ) be the σ-algebra generated by the information available after round t and abbreviate E t [·] = E[·|F t ]. A core question in partial monitoring is to understand how L and Φ affect the growth of R * n (G) in terms of the horizon. The main theorem of Bartók et al. [2014] shows that for all 'nondegenerate' games the minimax regret falls into one of four categories as illustrated in the table. The colloquial meaning of the adjective degenerate suggests that only nondegenerate games are interesting, but this is not the case. The term is used in a technical sense (to be clarified soon) referring to a subclass of games that we have no reason to believe should be less important than the nondegenerate ones.
Preliminaries To illustrate some of the difficulties of partial monitoring relative to bandits we formalize a simplistic version of the spam filtering problem. Example 1 Let c ≥ 0 and define partial monitoring game G = (L, Φ) by
The idea is also illustrated in the tables on the right. Rows correspond to actions of the learner and columns to outcomes selected by the adversary. The learner has three actions in this game corresponding to 'spam', 'not spam' and 'don't know' while the adversary chooses between 'spam' and 'not spam'. The learner suffers a loss of 1 if it guesses incorrectly. Alternatively the learner can say they don't know in which case they suffer a loss of c and observe some meaningful feedback. The minimax regret for this game depends on the price of information. If c > 1/2, then the minimax regret is Θ(n 2/3 ). On the other hand, if c ∈ (0, 1/2] the minimax regret isΘ(n 1/2 ) whereΘ(·) indicates growth up to logarithmic factors. Finally, when c = 0 a policy can suffer no regret by playing just the third action.
Example 2 The game on the right is hopeless because the learner cannot gain information about her loss and the adversary can always force the expected regret to be Ω(n).
Cell decomposition In order to understand what makes a partial monitoring game hard, easy or hopeless, it helps to introduce a linear structure. Let u t = e it ∈ P E−1 be the standard basis vector that is nonzero in the coordinate of the outcome i t chosen by the adversary in round t. For action a let ℓ a ∈ [0, 1] E be the ath row of matrix L. The cell C a of action a is the subset of P E−1 on which action a is optimal: C a = {u ∈ P E−1 : max b∈[K] ℓ a − ℓ b , u = 0}. Action a is optimal in hindsight if and only if 1 n n t=1 u t ∈ C a . Each nonempty C a is a polytope and the collection {C a : a ∈ [K]} is called the cell decomposition of G. An action is called dominated if it is never optimal: C a = ∅. We define the dimension of nondominated action a to be the dimension of C a , which ranges between 0 and E − 1. Nondominated actions with dimension less than E − 1 are called degenerate while actions with dimension E −1 are called Pareto optimal. A partial monitoring game is degenerate if it has at least one degenerate action. For each u ∈ P E−1 let a * u ∈ arg min a ℓ a , u and a * t ∈ arg min a t s=1 ℓ a , u s , which means that a * u is an optimal action if the adversary is playing u on average and a * t is the optimal action in hindsight when the adversary plays the sequence (u 1 , . . . , u t ). Without loss of generality we assume that a * u and a * t are nondegenerate. A pair of nondegenerate actions a, b are neighbors if C a ∩ C b has dimension E − 2. They are weak neighbors if C a ∩ C b = ∅. Actions a and b are called duplicates if ℓ a = ℓ b . We let N a be the set of actions consisting of a and its neighbors (but not the duplicates of a). For any pair of neighbors (a, b) let
Although a is not a neighbor of itself we define N aa = ∅. Lemma 1 (Bartók et al. 2014, Lem. 11) . Let a and b be neighbors. Then for all d ∈ N ab there exists a unique
A corollary is that for d ∈ N ab and if α from the lemma lies in (0, 1), then C d = C a ∩C b . Degenerate and dominated actions can never be uniquely optimal in hindsight, but they can provide information to the learner that proves the difference between a hard and hopeless game (or easy and hard). This is also true for duplicate actions, which have the same loss, but not necessarily the same feedback.
Observability The neighborhood structure determines which actions can be uniquely optimal and when. This is only half of the story. The other half is the relationship between the feedback and loss matrices that defines the difficulty of identifying the optimal action. A natural first attempt towards designing an algorithm would be to construct an unbiased estimator of y ta for each Pareto optimal action a. A moments thought produces easy games where this is impossible (Exhibit 1 in Appendix I). A more fruitful idea is to estimate the loss differences y ta − y tb for Pareto optimal actions a and b, which is sufficient (and essentially necessary) to discover the optimal action. Suppose in round t the learner has chosen to sample A t ∼ P t where P t ∈ ri(P K−1 ). A conditionally unbiased estimator of y ta − y tb is a function g : 
They are locally observable if in addition to the above a and b are neighbors and v(c, f ) = 0 whenever c / ∈ N ab . Finally, they are pairwise observable if v(c, f ) = 0 whenever c / ∈ {a, b}. If the learner is sampling action A t from distribution P t ∈ ri(P K−1 ), then the existence of a function satisfying Eq. (1) means that v(A t , Φ t )/P tAt is an unbiased estimator of ℓ a −ℓ b , u t = y ta −y tb . A game G is called globally/locally observable if all pairs of neighbors are globally/locally observable. A game is called point-locally observable if all pairs of weak neighbors are pairwise observable. The cell decomposition and observability structure for the spam game is described in detail in Exhibit 2. Note that in globally observable games it is easy to see that any pair of Pareto optimal actions are globally observable, not just the neighbors.
Classification theorem
The following theorem classifies partial monitoring games into four categories depending on the observability structure. 
if G has no pairs of neighboring actions ; Θ( √ n), if G is locally observable and has neighboring actions ; Θ(n 2/3 ), if G is globally observable, but not locally observable ; Ω(n), otherwise .
The theorem follows by proving upper and lower bounds for each class of games. Most of the pieces already exist in the literature. The upper bound for globally observable games is by Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2006] . The upper bound for games with no pairs of neighboring actions is trivial, since in this case there exists an action a with C a = P E−1 and playing this action alone ensures zero regret. The lower bound for easy games is by Antos et al. [2013, §6] and for hard games by Bartók et al. [2014, §4] . All that remains is to prove an upper bound for locally observable games with at least one pair of neighboring actions.
3 Algorithm for locally observable games
Fix a locally observable game G = (L, Φ) with at least one pair of neighboring actions. We introduce a policy called NEIGHBORHOODWATCH2 (Algorithm 1).
Preprocessing The new algorithm always chooses its action A t ∈ ∪ a,b N ab where the union is over pairs of neighboring actions. For example, in the game with cell decomposition shown in the figure the policy only plays actions 1, 2, 3 and 4. Removing (some) degenerate actions can only increase the minimax regret so from now on we assume that all actions in [K] 
Find distributionP t such thatP
Compute
Compute loss-difference estimators for each k ∈ A and a ∈ N k ∩ A.
q ← p 10:
end for
15:
return q 16: end function Description In each round the algorithm first computes a collection of exponential weights distribution Q tk ∈ P K−1 , one for each k ∈ A. The distribution Q tk is supported on the N k ∩ A when k ∈ A and for k ∈ D it is uniform on A. These local distributions are then combined into a global distributionP t , which is taken to be the stationary distribution of right-stochastic matrix Q t , which means thatP
These steps are the same as the original NEIGHBORHOODWATCH, which samples its action from (1 − γ)P t + γ1/K. This does not work when there are degenerate actions because Q tkd = 0 when d ∈ D, which by the above display means that P td = γ/K for actions d ∈ D and non-adaptive forced exploration is not sufficient for O( √ n) regret in partial monitoring. This is the role of the redistribution function, which is analyzed formally in Appendix A. The final part of the algorithm is to estimate the loss differences for each k ∈ A and a ∈ N k ∩ A. Our choice of loss estimators are another departure from the original algorithm, which only updated the estimators for one local game in each round and then used a complicated aggregation strategy. This is one source of significant simplification in the new algorithm. Remark 1. The special treatment of degenerate actions using the redistribution function seems like a big hassle. You might wonder why we did not simply include the degenerate actions in the local games and then play the stationary distribution, possibly with a little exploration. Unfortunately this idea does not work. Let d be a degenerate action in N ak where a and k are neighbors. Then Lemma 1 shows that the loss-difference between k and d can be estimated byẐ skd = αẐ skk + (1 − α)Ẑ ska with α such that
Intuitively, a degenerate action d in N ak is only useful for learning about the loss differences between actions a and k, which suggests the algorithm should not assign much more probability to d than the minimum probability of playing a and k. At a technical level the proof does not go through because the predictable variation of the estimator above is roughly Ω(max(1/P tk , 1/P ta )) and yet P td can be Ω(max(P tk , P ta )) and in the analysis of exponential weights these terms are required to cancel.
Remark 2. The estimatorsZ tka are negatively biased by β tka in order to prove high probability bounds, which is reminiscent of the Exp3.P algorithm for finite-armed adversarial bandits [Auer et al., 2002] . As a minor contribution, we generalize their analysis to the case where the loss estimators satisfy certain constraints, rather than taking the specific importance-weighted form used for adversarial bandits. Choosing β tka = 0 in the algorithm leads to a bound on the expected regret as we soon show. Theorem 2. Suppose Algorithm 1 is run on locally observable G = (L, Φ) with parameters δ ∈ (0, 1) and η = 1 V log(K/δ)/(nK) and γ = V Kη. Then with probability at least 1 − δ the regret is bounded by R n ≤ C G n log(e/δ)), where C G is a constant that depends on the game G, but not the horizon n or confidence level δ.
The complete proof of Theorem 2 given in Appendix B. Here we prove a bound on the expected regret in the simple case where there are no degenerate actions and β tka = 0. Although this proof does not highlight one of our main contributions (how to deal with degenerate actions), it does emphasize the enormous simplification of the new algorithm. The first step is a localization argument to bound the regret in terms of the 'local regret' in each neighborhood. We need a simple lemma, which for completeness we prove in the the appendix. Lemma 2 (Bartók et al. 2014). There exists a constant ε G > 0 depending only on G such that for all pairs of actions a,ã ∈ A and u ∈ Cã there exists an action b ∈ N a ∩ A such that
Since there are no degenerate actions, the REDISTRIBUTE function has no effect and
. . , B n be a sequence of random variables with B t ∼P t that is conditionally independent of A t given the observations up to time t. Then by Hoeffding-Azuma's inequality
Next we apply Lemma 2 to localize the second term,
where H is the set of functions φ :
with φ(a) ∈ N a for all a. Then using HoeffdingAzuma's inequality and a union bound over all φ ∈ H shows that with probability at least 1 − δ,
where the first equality uses the fact thatP t is the stationary distribution of Q t (see (3)). The local regret is bounded using the tools from online convex optimization. Of course the losses are never actually observed and must be replaced with the loss difference estimators. Then it remains to control the variance of these estimators. The 'standard' analysis of Exp3 [Auer et al., 1995, Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006] shows that
In order to bound the second term we substitute the definition ofẐ tka , which shows that
where in the first inequality we used the fact that v ak ∞ ≤ V . The second inequality follows by considering two cases. First, if A t = k, then all entries of the sum are non-zero and a∈N kP tk Q tka =P tk ≤ 2P tAt , which is true by choosing γ ≤ 1/2. For the second case A t = a for a ∈ N k and a = k, which means that only one term of the sum is non-zero. Then the definition ofP t as the stationary distribution of Q t means thatP tk Q tka ≤P ta ≤ 2P tAt . Combining this with Eqs. (4) to (6) and a union bound shows that with probability at least 1 − δ.
where we first used Lemma 3 below along with naive bounding and the fact that |H| ≤ K K . The Big-O follows by choosing η = 1 V log(K)/n and γ = ηKV . The choice of γ ensures that the loss-difference estimate satisfies η|Ẑ tka | ≤ ηV /P tAt ≤ ηV K/γ = 1 on which the proof of Eq. (6) relies. We prove in Appendix G that for games without degenerate actions the loss-difference estimators can always be chosen so that V ≤ 1 + F . Lemma 3. Suppose a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 1 are constants and X, Y are random variables such that
Dealing with degenerate actions The presence of degenerate actions makes the calculation significantly more fiddly. The first step is to show that the redistribution process guarantees that the expected loss accumulated by playing P t rather thanP t is not too great. The localization argument is then repeated and the remaining question is how to control the variance of the loss difference estimates. The redistribution process guarantees that the degenerate actions have sufficient mass that the variance is at most O(K) larger than what we saw in the above calculation. The process is complicated slightly by the desire to have a high probability bound.
Algorithm for point-locally observable games
The weakened neighbor definition and pairwise observability makes the analysis of point-locally observable games less delicate than locally observable games and the results are correspondingly stronger. Perhaps the most striking improvement is that asymptotically the bound does not dependent on arbitrarily large game-dependent constants. Here we present a simple new algorithm based on EXP3 called RELEXP3 ('Relative Exp3'). The name is derived from the fact that the algorithm does not estimate losses directly, but rather the loss differences relative to an 'anchor' arm that varies over time and is the arm to which the algorithm assigns the largest probability. As we shall see, this reduces the variance of the loss difference estimates.
Preprocessing The definition of pairwise observability means that degenerate and dominated actions are not needed to estimate the loss differences. Since removing these actions can only increase the minimax regret, for the remainder of this section we fix a point-locally observable game G = (L, Φ) for which there are no dominated or degenerate actions. A point-local game is a largest subset of actions A ⊆ [K] with a∈A C a = ∅ (a maximal clique of the graph over actions with edges representing weak neighbors). We let K loc be the size of the largest point-local game.
Estimation functions For each pair of actions a, b let v ab be an estimation function satisfying Eq. (1) and furthermore assume that v aa = 0 and v ab (c, f ) = 0 if a, b are weak neighbors and c / ∈ {a, b}. The existence of these functions is guaranteed by the definition of a point-locally observable game. Given pair of actions a, b let S ab be the set of actions needed to estimate the loss difference between a and b, which is Decreasing learning rates The algorithm makes use of a sequence of decreasing learning rates (η t ) ∞ t=1 and exploration parameters (α t ) ∞ t=1 . On top of this the algorithm also has a dynamic exploration component that ensures the loss difference estimates are not too large. The decreasing learning rate is one of the essential innovations that allows us to prove an asymptotic bound that is independent of arbitrarily large game-dependent quantities. As an added bonus, it also means the algorithm does not require advance knowledge of the horizon.
Let B t = arg max aP ta and M t = a :P ta exp
Sample A t ∼ P t and observe feedback Φ t
7:
For each a ∈ 
the linear dependence on F is unavoidable (see Appendix E).
Note that the constant hidden by the asymptotics does depend on arbitrarily large game-dependent constants. The proof of Theorem 3 may be found in the Appendix C, but the general idea is to show the forced exploration ensures for sufficiently large t that the algorithm is almost always playing in a point-local game that contains the optimal action and at this point the variance of the importanceweighted estimators is well behaved.
Summary and open problems
We completed the classification of all finite partial monitoring games. Along the way we greatly simplified existing algorithms and analysis and proved that for a large class of games the asymptotic regret does not depend on arbitrarily large game-dependent constants, which is the first time this has been demonstrated in the adversarial setting. There are many fascinating open problems. One of the most interesting is to understand to what extent it is possible to adapt to 'easy data'. For example, globally observable games may have locally observable subgames and one might hope for an algorithm with O( √ n) regret if the adversary is playing in this subgame and O(n 2/3 ) regret otherwise. Another question is to refine the definition of the regret to differentiate between algorithms in hopeless games where linear regret is unavoidable, but the coefficient can depend on the algorithm [Rustichini, 1999] . Yet another question is to understand to what extent V is a fundamental quantity in the regret for easy games and whether or not the arbitrarily large gamedependent constants are real for large n as we have shown they are not for point-locally observable games.
Lemma 4. Assume γ ∈ [0, 1/2] and let u ∈ P E−1 , and k, a ∈ A arbitrary neighbors. Then P t ∈ P K−1 is a probability vector and the following hold:
Proof. First we show that P t is indeed a probability vector. By assumptionP t is the stationary distribution, which is a probability distribution. LetP t = REDISTRIBUTE(P t ) so that
which means we need to show thatP t is a probability distribution. SinceP t is obtained by the iterative procedure given in the REDISTRIBUTE function it is sufficient to show that the vector q tracked by this algorithm is indeed a distribution. The claim is that each loop of the REDISTRIBUTE function does not break this property. The first observation is that the algorithm always moves mass from actions in A to actions in D. All that must be shown is thatP ta ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A. To see this note first that if a ∈ A is one of the choices of the algorithm in Line 11, then ρc a q a ≤ p a /(2K) and soP ta ≥P ta /2 for all a ∈ A ≥ 0 .
Part (a): Since γ ≤ 1/2 this follows from Eq. (7).
Part (b): First we show that a∈[K] (P ta −P ta )ℓ a = 0. It suffices to show that the redistribution in each inner loop of the algorithm does not change this value, which is true because
Then using the definition of P t we have
where we used the assumption that ℓ a ∈ [0, 1] E for all actions and u ∈ P E−1 so that ℓ a , u ∈ [0, 1].
Part (c): There are three cases: Either b = k or b = a or b is degenerate. If b = k, then the result is immediate from Part (a). If b = a, then, Part (a) combined with (3) implies that P tb = P ta ≥P ta /4 ≥P tk Q tka /4 ≥P tk Q tka /(4K). Finally, if b is degenerate, then by the definition of the rebalancing algorithm we havē
=P tk Q tka 2K and the result follows from Eq. (7).
Part (d):
This is trivial from the definition of P t .
Part (e): Let b ∈ A be the Pareto optimal action chosen by the rebalancing algorithm when d is given weight. Since ℓ d = ℓ a it follows that α = 1 and so c a = 1 and c b = 1, which means that P td =P ta /2 and using Eq. (7) again yields the result.
B Proof of Theorem 2
We start by proving Lemma 2. Since u ∈ Cã, 0 ≤ ℓ a −ℓã, u . The result is trivial if a,ã are neighbors or ℓ a −ℓã, u = 0. From now on assume that ℓ a −ℓã, u > 0 and that a,ã are not neighbors. Let v be the centroid of C a and consider the line segment connecting v and u. Then let w be the first point on this line segment for where there exists a b ∈ N a ∩ A with w ∈ C b (see figure) . Note that w is well-defined by the Jordan-Brouwer separation theorem and b is well-defined because A is a maximal duplicate-free subset of the Pareto optimal actions. Using twice that ℓ a − ℓ b , w = 0, we calculate
where the second equality used that w = v is a point of the line segment connecting v and u, hence w − v and u − w are parallel and share the same direction and v − w 2 > 0. The last inequality follows because v is the centroid of C a and a, b are distinct Pareto optimal actions. Let v c be the centroid of C c for any c ∈ A. Then,
where (a) follows since by (8), ℓ a − ℓ b , u > 0 and also because w ∈ C b implies that ℓ a − ℓã, w ≤ ℓ a − ℓ b , w , (b) follows since ℓ a − ℓ b , w = 0 (which is used in other steps, too), (c) uses (8), (d) is by Cauchy-Schwartz and in (e) we bounded w − v 2 ≤ √ 2 and used that ℓ a − ℓã 2 ≤ √ E and 
Proof. With no loss of generality we assume that a * n ∈ A because A is a maximal duplicate-free subset of Pareto optimal actions. Apply the previous lemma on subsequences of rounds where B t = a for each a ∈ A.
Lemma 6. Let δ ∈ (0, 1). Then with probability at least 1 − 2δ it holds that
By the definition of A t and B t and part (b) of Lemma 4 we have E t−1 [ ℓ At − ℓ Bt , u t ] ≤ γ. Furthermore, | ℓ a − ℓ b , u t | ≤ 1 for all a, b. Therefore, by Hoeffding-Azuma, with probability at least 1 − δ,
By Lemma 5, the surrogate regret is bounded in terms of the local regret:
We prepare to use Hoeffding-Azuma again. Fix φ ∈ H arbitrarily. Then,
where we used the fact thatP ta = kP tk Q tka . Hoeffding-Azuma's inequality now shows that with probability at least 1 − δ/|H|,
The result is completed via a union bound over all φ ∈ H and chaining with Eqs. (9) and (10), and noting that
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof has two steps. First bounding the local regret R nk for each k ∈ A and then merging the bounds using the previous lemma.
Step 1: Bounding the local regret For the remainder of this step we fix k ∈ A and bound the local regret R nk . First, we need to massage the local regret into a form in which we can apply Theorem 6, which is a generic version of the Exp3.P analysis by Auer et al. [2002] . Let Z tka =P tk (y ta − y tk ) and G t be the σ-algebra generated by (A 1 , . . . , A t ) and G = (G t ) n t=0 be the associated filtration. A simple rewriting shows that
In order to apply the result in Theorem 6 we need to check the conditions. Since (P t ) t and (P t ) t are G-predictable it follows that (β t ) t and (Z t ) t are also G-predictable. Similarly, (Ẑ t ) t is Gadapted because (A t ) t and (Φ t ) t are G-adapted. It remains to show that assumptions
, where the equality follows from the choice of γ. Assumption (b) is satisfied in a similar way with
where in the last inequality we used the definition of η and assumed that n ≥ K log(K/δ). To make sure that the regret bound holds even for smaller values of n, we require C G ≥ K log(eK) so that when n < K 2 log(K/δ), the regret bound is trivial. For assumption (c), we have
Finally (d) is satisfied by the definition of v ak and the fact that P t ∈ ri(P K−1 ). The result of Theorem 6 shows that with probability at least 1 − (K + 1)δ,
Step 2: Aggregating the local regret Using the result from the previous step in combination with a union bound over k ∈ A we have that with probability at least 1
For bounding the second term we use the definition of β tka from (2) and write
The sum over b ∈ N ak is split into two, separating duplicates of k and the rest:
where the first equality used that a Q tka = 1, the second to last inequality follows using parts (c) and (e) of Lemma 4, and the last inequality uses the reasoning above. Summing over all rounds and k ∈ A yields
For the last term in Eq. (12) we use the definition ofẐ tka and Lemma 4.(c) to show that
Now, from Lemma 4 (d), γ/K (1/P ta ) ≤ 1 for all a, and in particular, holds for a = A t .
Furthermore,
By the result in Lemma 10 it holds that with probability at least 1 − δ that
Another union bound shows that with probability at least 1 − (1 + K(K + 1))δ,
The result follows from the definition of η, Lemma 6 and the definition of R nk .
C Proof of Theorem 3
Before the proof we need a simple lemma showing that if actions a and b are not weak neighbours, then the regret of either a or b grows linearly in t. 
Proof. For (a) let c ∈ [K] be arbitrary. Since C a ∩ C b = ∅ it follows that ℓ a + ℓ b − 2ℓ c , u > 0 for all u ∈ C c . By compactness of C c and the continuity of the inner product in u we conclude that inf u∈Cc ℓ a + ℓ b − 2ℓ c , u > 0. Taking the minimum over all c shows that
, u < 2ε G , which by (a) means that a and b are weak neighbours. Therefore all actions in M u are weak neighbours of each other so
The next lemma uses the concentration of the loss estimators to show that with high probability the distributionP t calculated by RELEXP3 assigns negligible probability to actions that are either not neighbours of B t or for which the loss is large relative to the optimal action. Lemma 8. Let Z ta = ℓ a − ℓ Bt , u t and L ta = t s=1 Z sa . Then there exists an event FAIL with P (FAIL) ≤ 1/n and function g :
(c) There exist constants c 1 , c 2 ≥ 0 depending on G = (L, Φ) and the choice of ε in the definition of α t such that for all t ≥ c 1 log c2 (n) it holds that g(t) ≥ 1 2 ε G t.
Proof. Define random variable
Given an arbitrary pair of arms (a, b), from the triangle inequality we have
The quantity φ t is bounded with high probability via a union bound over all pairs of arms and a martingale version of Bernstein's bound [Freedman, 1975] , which shows there exists a gamedependent constant C G > 0 such that
Choose g(t) = max{0, (t − 1)ε G − C G t 3/4+ε/2 log 1 2 (n)}, which clearly satisfies the condition in (c). First suppose that a is not a weak neighbour of B t+1 , which by the definition of B t+1 , φ t and Lemma 7 ensures that
On the other hand if
The result follows from the fact thatP ta ≤ exp(η t (L t−1,Bt −L t−1,a )) for any action.
Proof of Theorem 3. Choose ε ∈ (0, 1/2) and
First note that the choices of η t and α t ensures that γ t 1 ≤ 1/2 and so P t is indeed a probability distribution and P ta ≥P ta /2 for all t and a. Let N t be the set of weak neighbours of B t . Since
where in the inequality we used Cauchy-Schwartz and the fact that Z t ∞ ≤ 1. The analysis of exponential weights given in Theorem 2.3 of the book by Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006] yields
Note that we have stopped the proof before the application of Hoeffding's lemma, which is not appropriate for bandits due to the large range of the loss estimates. Suppose that a ∈ M t , then for any b ∈ S aBt ⊆ S t we have P tb ≥ γ tb ≥ η t V aBt , which means that
Then using exp(x) ≤ 1 + x + x 2 for x ≤ 1 leads tõ
On the other hand, if a / ∈ M t then by the definitions of M t ,Ẑ ta and P t ,
which by the fact that x ≤ 1 + x ≤ exp(x) for all x also implies thatP taẐta ≤ 1/t. Using log(1 + x) ≤ x,
Next we bound the conditional second moment ofẐ ta . If a and B t are weak neighbours, theñ
where in the last line we used the fact that P tAt ≥ P ta whenever A t ∈ {a, B t } and E t−1 [1 {A t ∈ {a, B t }}] = 2 and P tAt ≥ (1 − γ t 1 )P tAt =P tAt (1 − o (1)). On the other hand, if a and B t are not weak neighbours, then
The second sum is bounded using parts (a) and (c) of Lemma 8, which shows that
Suppose that FAIL does not hold and define t 0 by
which by part (c) of Lemma 8 and rearrangement satisfies t 0 = O(polylog(n)). The definition of t 0 ensures that if t ≥ t 0 and a is an action with ℓ a − ℓ a * t−1
and so a / ∈ M t . Therefore when FAIL does not hold and t ≥ t 0 ,
But by Lemma 7 the number of arms in this set is at most K loc and so in this case |M t | ≤ K loc . Since |M t | ≤ K regardless of t or the failure event,
Combining the above display with Eqs. (13) and (14) shows that
Next we bound the sum of the expectations of γ t 1 . To begin notice that if M t contains only neighbours of B t , then S t = M t and max a∈Mt V aBt ≤ V loc . The definitions of γ t and α t = o( 1/t) means that γ t 1 = η t |S t | max a∈Mt V aBt + o( 1/t) and so the same argument as above shows that
Putting the pieces together and using the fact that n t=1
The result is completed by recalling that v ab (·) were chosen so that V loc ≤ 1 + F .
D Lower Bounds for Hard Games
In this section we prove a Ω(n 2/3 ) lower bound on the minimax regret in hard partial monitoring games. Like for bandits, by Yao's minimax principle [Yao, 1977] , the lower bounds are most easily proven using a stochastic adversary. In stochastic partial monitoring we assume that u 1 , . . . , u n are chosen independently at random from the same distribution. To emphasise the randomness we switch to capital letters. Given a partial monitoring problem G = (L, Φ) and a probability vector u ∈ P E−1 the stochastic partial monitoring environment associated with u samples a sequence of independently and identically distribution random variables U 1 , . . . , U n with U t ∈ {e 1 , . . . , e E } with P (U t = e i ) = u i . In each round t a policy chooses action A t and receives feedback Φ t = Φ(A t , U t ). The regret is
The mentioned minimax principle implies that R * n (G) ≥ inf π sup u R n (u, π, G). Hence, in what follows, we lower bound sup u R n (u, π, G) for fixed π.
Given u, v ∈ P E−1 , let KL(u, v) be the relative entropy between categorical distributions with parameters u and v respectively:
where the second inequality follows from the fact that for measures P ≪ Q we have KL(P, Q) ≤ χ 2 (P, Q). We need one more simple result that is frequently used in lower bound proofs. Given measures P and Q on the same probability space, Lemma 2.6 in the book by Tsybakov [2008] says that for any event A, 
Proof. The proof involves several steps. Roughly, we need to define two alternative stochastic partial monitoring problems. We then show these environments are hard to distinguish without playing an action associated with a large loss. Finally we balance the cost of distinguishing the environments against the linear cost of playing randomly.
Fix a policy π and a partial monitoring game G with the required properties. For u ∈ P E−1 let P u denote the measure on sequences of outcomes (A 1 , Φ 1 , . . . , A n , Φ n ) induced by the interaction of a fixed policy and the stochastic partial monitoring problem determined by u and G and denote by E u the corresponding expectation. Note that
Step 1: Defining the alternatives Let a, b be a pair neighbouring actions that are not locally observable. Then by definition C a ∩ C b is a polytope of dimension E − 2. Let u be the centroid of C a ∩ C b and
The value of ε is well-defined, since by global observability of G, but nonlocal observability of (a, b) there must exist some action c / ∈ N ab . Furthermore, since c / ∈ N ab it follows that ε > 0. We also have u ∈ ri(P E−1 ). We now define two stochastic partial monitoring problems. Since (a, b) are not locally observable, there is no function v :
To facilitate the next step we rewrite this using a linear structure. For action c ∈ [K] let S c ∈ {0, 1} F ×E be the matrix with (S c ) f i = 1 {Φ(c, i) = f }, which is chosen so that S c e i = e Φci .
Define the linear map S :
which is the matrix formed by stacking the matrices {S c : c ∈ N ab }. Then there exists a v satisfying Eq. (18) if and only if there exists a vector w ∈ R |N ab |F such that
In other words, actions (a, b) are locally observable if and only if ℓ a − ℓ b ∈ img(S ⊤ ). Since we have assumed that (a, b) are not locally observable, it follows that ℓ a − ℓ b / ∈ img(S ⊤ ). Let z ∈ img(S ⊤ ) and w ∈ ker(S) be such that ℓ a − ℓ b = z + w, which is possible since img(S ⊤ ) ⊕ ker(S) = R E . Since ℓ a − ℓ b / ∈ img(S ⊤ ) it holds that w = 0 and w, ℓ a − ℓ b = w, z + w = w, w = 0. Finally let v = w/ w, ℓ a − ℓ b . It follows that Sv = 0 and v, ℓ a − ℓ b = 1.
2 Let ∆ > 0 be some small constant to be tuned subsequently and define u a = u − ∆v and u b = u + ∆v so that
We note that if ∆ is sufficiently small, then u a ∈ C a ∩ri(P E−1 ) and u b ∈ C b ∩ri(P E−1 ). This means that action a is optimal if the environment plays u a on average and b is optimal if the environment plays u b on average and that u a and u b are in the relative interior of the (E − 1)-simplex (see Fig. 1 ).
Step 2: Calculating the relative entropy Given action c and w ∈ P E−1 let P cw be the distribution on the feedback observed by the learner when playing action c in stochastic partial monitoring environment determined by w. That is P cw (f ) = P w (Φ t = f |A t = c) = (S c w) f . Let T c (n) be the number of times action c is played over all n rounds. The chain rule for relative entropy shows that
By definition of u a and u b we have S c u a = S c u b for all c ∈ N ab . Therefore P cua = P cu b and so KL(P cua , P cu b ) = 0 for all c ∈ N ab . On the other hand, if c / ∈ N ab , then thanks to u a , u b , u ∈ ri(P E−1 ) and Eq. (15),
where C u is a suitably large constant and we assume that ∆ is chosen sufficiently small that
whereT (n) is the number of times an arm not in N ab is played:
Step 3: Comparing the regret By Eq. (17) and the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality for c / ∈ N ab we have
which means that max( ℓ c − ℓ a , u a , ℓ c − ℓ b , u b ) ≥ ∆/2. DefineT (n) as the number of times some arm in N ab is played that is at least ∆/2 suboptimal in u a :
Assume that ∆ is chosen sufficiently small so that 2∆ v ∞ ≤ ε/2. Then
In the above display we used (21) and
where the second inequality follows from the high probability version of Pinsker's inequality Eq. (16) 
E Lower Bound for Theorem 3
We consider the following game with K = 2 and E = 2F − 2 and G = (L, Φ) given by
Theorem 5. For n sufficiently large the minimax regret of G is at least R *
F Generic Bound for Exponential Weights
The proof of Theorem 2 depends on a generic regret analysis for a variant of the EXP3.P bandit algorithm by Auer et al. [1995] . The main difference is that loss estimators are assumed to be god-given and satisfy certain properties, rather than being explicitly defined as biased importanceweighted estimators. Nothing here would startle an expert, but we do not know where an equivalent result is written in the literature. Let (Ω, F , (F t ) n t=0 , P) be a filtered probability space and abbreviate
To reduce clutter we assume for the remainder that t ranges in [n] and a ∈ [K].
Recall that a sequence of random elements (X t ) is called adapted if X t is F t -measurable for all t, while (X t ) is called predictable if X t is F t−1 -measurable for all t. Let (Z t ) and (Z t ) be sequences of random elements in R K . Given nonempty A ⊆ [K] and positive constant η define the probability vector Q t ∈ P K−1 by 
, with probability at least
Proof. We proceed in five steps.
Step 1: Decomposition n t=1 a∈A
.
Step 2: Bounding (A) By assumption (c) we have β ta ≥ 0, which by assumption (a) means that ηZ ta ≤ ηẐ ta ≤ η|Ẑ ta | ≤ 1 for all a ∈ A. Then the standard mirror descent analysis with negentropy regularisation [Hazan, 2016] shows that (A) is bounded by
where in the last two line we used the assumptions that ηβ ta ≤ 1 and η|Ẑ ta | ≤ 1.
Step 3: Bounding (B) For (B) we have 
Therefore by Lemma 10, with probability at least 1 − δ
Step 4: Bounding (C) For (C) we have
Because A * is random we cannot directly apply Lemma 10, but need a union bound over all actions. Let a ∈ A be fixed. Then by Lemma 10 and the assumption that η|Ẑ ta | ≤ 1 and E t−1 [Ẑ ta ] = Z ta and ηE t−1 [Ẑ 2 ta ] ≤ β ta , with probability at least 1 − δ.
Therefore by a union bound we have with probability at most 1 − Kδ,
Step 5: Putting it together Combining the bounds on (A), (B) and (C) in the last three steps with the decomposition in the first step shows that with probability at least 1 − (K + 1)δ,
where we used the assumption that δ ≤ 1/K. where we used the inequalities exp(x) ≤ 1 + x + x 2 for x ≤ 1 and 1 + x ≤ exp(x) for all x ∈ R. Chaining the above inequality completes the proof. 
I Gallery
Exhibit 1. In the following game the learner cannot estimate the actual losses, but the loss differences can be calculated from the feedback directly. In this case P E−1 = P 1 is 1-dimensional, which means the intersection of the epigraph of P E−1 and the hypograph of f is 2-dimensional and is shown in the left figure below. The intersection is itself a polytope and the faces (1-dimensional in this case) pointing upwards correspond to cells of nondegenerate actions. If c is increased to 1/2, then the third action becomes degenerate, which is observable from the right-hand figure below by noting that the dimension of its intersection with the polytope is now zero. Increasing c any further would make this action dominated. The cell decomposition for this game is shown on above-right. Notice that (1, 2) are not neighbours, but are weak neighbours. And yet (1, 2) are not pairwise observable. Therefore the game is not point-locally observable. On the other hand, both sets of neighbours (1, 2) and (1, 3) are locally observable.
Exhibit 4. This game produces the cell decomposition depicted at the start of Section 3. The only neighbours are (2, 3) and (1, 3), which are locally observable. Therefore the game is locally observable. Actions 4,5 and 6 are degenerate. NEIGHBOURHOODWATCH2 will only play actions 1, 2, 3 and 4 with actions 5 and 6 ruled out because their cells are not equal to the intersection of any neighbours cells. Notice that ℓ 4 = ℓ 2 /2 + ℓ 3 /2 is a convex combination of ℓ 2 and ℓ 3 . 
